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1 Introduction
The treatment of the tax saving from debt in valuation has recently become a subject of renewed in-
terest (Fernandez (2004), Cooper and Nyborg (2005)). However, there is still no standard approach
with respect to calculating tax-adjusted discount rates in the presence of risky debt. Taggart (1991)
extends the Miles-Ezzell (1980) formula for tax-adjusted discount rates by including the effect of
personal taxes, but assumes that corporate debt is riskless. In practice, the cost of corporate debt
includes a default spread. This can be a significant part of the cost of capital for some firms, es-
pecially with low interest rates, high leverage, and the lower equity risk premia that are now often
used. Therefore, the correct treatment of the debt risk premium is necessary for realistic valuation.
This paper extends Taggart’s analysis by deriving the tax-adjusted discount rate formula for com-
panies that follow the Miles-Ezzell (ME) leverage policy when both investor taxes and risky debt
are included.
An alternative treatment is provided by Sick (1990), who derives a formula which he contrasts
with an expression given in Brealey and Myers (1988).1 According to Sick, the Brealey and Myers
formula differs from his “..by the incorrect treatment of risky debt, as well as the failure to recognize
that tax shields should be discounted at a cost of equity...” (Sick, 1990, p.1441). In this paper,
we unify the treatments of Sick and Brealey and Myers. We clarify the source of the difference
between their formulas for tax-adjusted discount rates, which turns out to depend on the way that
companies are taxed when they are in default. Sick makes a particular assumption about this,
which leads to a simplification of the way that interest tax shields are valued. We then derive
valuation and cost of capital procedures with an assumption about taxes which we believe to be
more realistic than that used by Sick. This leads to an extended version of the Miles-Ezzell formula
that is similar, but not identical, to that given by Brealey and Myers. We show that the different
approaches can lead to economically significantly different discount rates and values.
We include the possibility that the effect of investor taxes may make the tax benefit to borrowing
less than the full corporate tax rate. For the US, there is evidence that this may be the case. Fama
and French (1998) fail to find any increase in firm value associated with debt tax savings. On the
other hand, Kemsley and Nissim (2002) use a different estimation technique and find that the net
tax advantage to debt similar to the corporate tax rate. Thus, while the US empirical evidence is
inconclusive, it certainly admits the possibility that investor taxes make the net tax advantage to
1This expression is still in Brealey and Myers (2003),
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debt less than the full corporate tax rate.2 The changes to the US tax code introduced in 2003
increase any advantage of dividend income over interest income for most investors, which will tend
to reduce the tax benefit of debt. In other countries, there are even stronger reasons to believe that
investor taxes offset part of the corporate tax advantage to debt. In particular, where countries
have imputation taxes, such an effect is built directly into their tax systems (Rajan and Zingales
(1995)).
2 The tax-adjusted discount rate
We operate under the Miles-Ezzell (1980) leverage assumption, that leverage is maintained at a
constant proportion of the market value of the firm. This is the most realistic simple leverage policy,
and also the one that is consistent with the use of the weighted average cost of capital (WACC).
The Miles-Ezzell formula applies to any profile of cash flows as long as the company maintains
constant market value leverage. It gives a relationship between the leveraged discount rate, RL,
and the unleveraged rate, RU . We analyze a firm with expected pre-tax cash flows Ct, at dates
t = 1, . . . , T . Between these dates, leverage remains fixed. After each cash flow, leverage is reset
to be a constant proportion, L, of the leveraged value of the firm. The two rates RU and RL are
defined implicitly as the discount rates that give the correct unleveraged and leveraged values when
the after-tax operating cash flows are discounted:3
VUt = ΣTi=t+1Ci(1− TC)/(1 +RU )i t = 1, ...T (1)
VLt = ΣTi=t+1Ci(1− TC)/(1 +RL)i t = 1, ...T (2)
where VUt is the unleveraged value of the firm and VLt its leveraged value.
We assume that the representative investor has tax rates of TPD on debt returns and
TPE on equity income and capital gains. The increase in the after-tax cash flow to this investor
resulting from an incremental dollar of corporate interest is:
TS = (1 − TPD)− (1− TC)(1− TPE) (3)
2Graham (2000) finds that the net tax advantage to debt is less than the full corporate tax rate because of non-
debt tax shields. The valuation consequences of this are more complicated, because it implies that the tax rate that
should be used in valuation is state and time-dependent.
3We assume that tax is levied on the operating cash flows. A more complex treatment does not alter the results.
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This result is standard. We define the related variable, T ∗, by:
T ∗ = TS/(1− TPD) (4)
Thus:
1− T ∗ = (1− TC)(1− TPE)
1− TPD
(5)
Following Taggart (1991), we define the required return on riskless equity as:
RFE =
RF (1− TPD)
(1− TPE)
=
RF (1− TC)
(1− T ∗)
(6)
The first equality results from setting the after-investor-tax returns on riskless debt and riskless
equity equal to each other. The second equality follows from (5). Note that if TPD and TPE are
equal then RFE = RF .
The equation that relates RU and RL is one of the most important in valuation. It is used
whenever discount rates are adjusted to a different amount of leverage. Even when adjusted present
value methods are used to take account of the tax saving from debt, this relationship may first need
to be used to derive the unlevered required return. The original Miles-Ezzell formula that relates
RU and RL was derived with an informal treatment of risky debt and no investor taxes. It depends
on the ’cost of debt’ where this could be interpreted either as the yield or the expected return. For
clarity, we define the yield on the debt as YD, and the expected return on the debt as RD.4 The
difference is the effect of expected default.5 Miles-Ezzell give the relationship between RU and RL
as:
RL = RU −
LRDTC(1 +RU )
1 +RD
(7)
where their ’cost of debt’ has been interpreted here as its expected return. Brealey and Myers
(2003, page 542), generalize this to the case of investor taxes by using T ∗ rather than TC :
RL = RU −
LRDT ∗(1 +RU )
1 +RD
(8)
Sick (1990) derives a different relationship:6
RL = RU −
LRFET ∗(1 +RU )
1 +RFE
(9)
4In particular, YD is the coupon on debt issued at par.
5See Cooper and Davydenko (2001) and (2004) for a more extensive discussion of this point.
6The notation in Sick (1990) is slightly different, but the result can be derived by simple substitution.
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The key difference, as stated by Sick, is that his result involves the use of the riskless interest rate
rather than the cost of debt, and adjusts the interest rate for the relative tax treatment of debt
and equity by using RFE.
3 The assumptions underlying the different approaches
The difference between the assumptions underlying the Sick and ’Brealey and Myers’ approaches
concerns whether a tax payment will be made when the company is insolvent. Sick assumes that
an insolvent firm will make a tax payment equal to the gain made from writing off the debt relative
to its face value multiplied by the tax rate [see Sick (1990), p.1437]. If the write-off is total then
the entire principal of the debt will be taxed when the firm is in default. The assumption implicit
in the ’Brealey and Myers’ approach is that no such payment will be made. The issue is, therefore,
whether insolvent firms can be expected to make such tax payments. The evidence is that insolvent
companies do not pay tax (Gilson (1997)). Therefore, the tax payment in the insolvent state that
Sick assumes will not, in general, be made.
We illustrate the implications of the assumption made by Sick and that made by Brealey and
Myers using a binomial tree. Figure 1 panel 1A shows two alternative assumptions about the tax
saving from interest. The first tree, headed, ’Bond’ shows a bond that pays a yield of YD if it
does not default. Default is shown by the lower branch of the tree, which results in a total loss.
The second panel, headed ’BM’ shows a tax saving that occurs only if the firm is solvent. If the
company is solvent, it saves tax of an amount TCYD per dollar of face value of the bond. If the
company is insolvent, there is no tax impact of having the debt, as the company is assumed to pay
no tax in this state. In this case, the tax saving has the same level of risk as the bond. In contrast,
the third tree shows the assumption made by Sick (1990). Here the tax saving in the solvent state
is the same. However, when the company is insolvent, the existence of the debt results in an extra
tax payment of TC . This is the extra tax resulting from the gain made by writing off the initial
debt of $1.
It is straightforward to show, by no-arbitrage, that the value of the tax saving per dollar of debt
in the ’BM’ case is:
PV TSBM = TCYD/(1 + YD) (10)
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and the result shown by Sick (1990) is:
PV TSS = TCRF /(1 +RF ) (11)
Because they are based on no-arbitrage, these values are independent of the probability of the
firm remaining solvent. As with all no-arbitrage values, however, there is an alternative interpre-
tation in terms of expected cash flows discounted at expected rates of return. We assume that
the true probability of the firm remaining solvent is p. In the Brealey and Myers case, the ex-
pected tax saving is pTCYD, and the appropriate required return is the expected return on the
bond [p(1 + YD)− 1]. Therefore:
PV TSBM = pTCYD/[p(1 + YD)] = TCYD/(1 + YD) (12)
Discounting the expected tax saving at the expected return on the bond is shown by the second
term in this equation. This gives the correct value of the tax saving, because it is equal to the
no-arbitrage value, as shown by the second equality.
With the assumptions made by Sick, the valuation of the tax saving using expected returns is
more complex. This can be seen by decomposing the binomial representation of the tax saving into
two parts, shown in Figure 1B. One part is riskless, and the other has a level of risk equal to that
of the bond. The first part can be valued by discounting at the riskless rate and the second by
replication with the bond. Thus:
PV TSS = −TC/(1 +RF ) + p(TCYD + TC)/[p(1 + YD)] = TCRF /(1 +RF ) (13)
The second term in the equation is the two components of the expected payoff, each discounted at
an appropriate expected return. This is equal to the value based on no-arbitrage, shown by the
final term. Sick states the result in terms of this no-arbitrage value.
As we have discussed above, the assumption made by the ’Brealey and Myers’ approach appears
to be more consistent with the actual tax treatment of firms in default. Therefore, we make their
assumption throughout the rest of the paper. In particular, we assume that the tax saving from
risky debt should be valued by discounting the expected tax saving at the expected return on the
debt, as in the first equality in (12).
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4 The relationship between leveraged and unleveraged rates
Appendix 1 shows that, under the standard Miles-Ezzell assumptions with the inclusion of risky
debt and investor taxes, the relationship between RL and RU is:
RL = RU −
[LRDT ∗(1 +RU )/(1 +RFE)](RFE/RF )[1 +RF (1− TPD)]
1 +RD(1− TPD)
(14)
which is equal to:
RL = RU −
[LRDT ∗(1 +RU )/(1 +RFE)][(1 − TC)/(1 − T ∗)][1 +RF (1− TPD)]
1 +RD(1− TPD)
(15)
The difference from Brealey and Myers’ expression lies mainly in the second term in square
brackets. They do not include this term in their intuitively derived expression. The difference
from Sick’s expression can be seen by making the debt riskless. Then RD = RF , giving:
RL = RU −
LRFET ∗(1 +RU )
1 +RFE
(16)
This is the expression given in Sick (1990) for risky debt and in Taggart (1991) for riskless debt. If
the debt is riskless and there are also no investor taxes, then RD = RF and T ∗ = TC , giving:
RL = RU −
LRFTC(1 +RU )
1 +RF
(17)
This is the standard Miles-Ezzell result with riskless debt. As we have shown above, the general
form of the relationship between RL and RU is (14), rather than this simpler expression. We discuss
below the size of the errors that result from using various approximations.
If the period between rebalancing the leverage becomes short, (14) converges to:
RL = RU − LRDT ∗
1− TC
1− T ∗ (18)
Both this and the more complex version of the ME formula given by (14) are approximations.
Neither policy exactly reflects the actual leverage policies that firms follow. It is not clear which
expression more accurately reflects the way that companies actually determine their leverage over
time. Apart from its simplicity, (18) has one significant advantage. As we show below, when
TC = T ∗ it is consistent with the standard formula for asset betas.
4.1 Errors arising from using different formulas
To evaluate the size of possible errors arising from using approximations to the correct formulas,
we examine three types of firm. These are shown in Table 1 Panel A. The first firm, in Cases 1
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and 4, has a typical amount of leverage and a debt spread of 1%. The second firm, shown in Cases
2 and 5, has higher leverage and a debt spread of 2%. The third firm, in cases 3 and 6, has very
high leverage and a debt spread of 3%. All firms have an unleveraged cost of capital of 8%. The
general parameters are a riskless rate of 4%, a corporate tax rate of 40%, and a marginal investor
tax rate on debt of 40%. In cases 1-3 the tax saving from debt, T ∗, is the full corporate tax rate,
whereas in cases 3-6 it is half the corporate tax rate. This implicitly varies the marginal investor’s
tax rate on equity returns from 20% in cases 1-3 to 40% in cases 4-6. We compute RL from (14)
and compare the values given by four other formulas.
Table 1: Errors resulting from different formulas for RL.
This table shows the errors arising from using different formulas to calculate the leveraged cost of capital,
RL. The unlevered cost of capital, RU , is 8 % and other variables are : RF = 4%, TC = 40%, TPD = 40%.
Panel A shows three different firms, with leverage of 30%, 60% and 80% and debt costs of 5%, 6%
and 7% respectively. The tax saving from interest, T ∗, is assumed to be either 40% or 20%, which
is equivalent to setting TPE = 40% or 20%, respectively. The (benchmark) values of RL in Panel
A are calculated using (14). Panel B rows (a), (b), (c), and (d) show the errors in RL (alternative
formula less benchmark) resulting from using the alternatives (8), (9), (18), and 16 respectively.
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
(A) Inputs
L 30% 60% 80% 30% 60% 80%
RD 5% 6% 7% 5% 6% 7%
T ∗ 40% 40% 40% 20% 20% 20%
RL 7.38% 6.52% 5.71% 7.77% 7.44% 7.13%
(B) Errors in estimates of RL from using different formulas
a. BM 0.00% 0.01% 0.03% -0.07% -0.172% -0.26%
b. Sick 0.10% 0.44% 0.91% 0.04% 0.16% 0.34%
c. Continuous Approximation 0.02% 0.04% 0.05% 0.01% 0.02% 0.03%
d. Taggart 0.12% 0.48% 0.96% 0.05% 0.18% 0.36%
Panel B shows the errors resulting from using three other formulas. The first is the formula
given in Brealey and Myers (8) shown in row (a). When the tax saving is equal to the full corporate
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tax rate, this is very accurate, as one would expect. However, the accuracy depends on interpreting
the cost of debt correctly as the expected return on debt, rather than its yield. If the yield is used,
significant errors can result, as shown in Cooper and Davydenko (2001). The main error in the
formula arises because it does not treat investor taxes properly. This error shows up when the
leverage is high, and the tax saving is less than the full corporate tax saving, in case 6. The error
here is a quarter of one percent, enough to cause significant errors in company valuation. Row
(b) shows the error arising from using the Sick formula (9). Here the errors are larger, especially
when the debt spread is high. The difference here occurs because of the different treatment of the
impact of default on the tax saving from interest, discussed above. Row (c) shows the error from
using the continuous approximation (18) rather than the discrete formula (14). This error is small,
indicating that the extra complexity of the formulas that assume discrete adjustment of leverage is
probably unnecessary. The expression (18) appears to be the best way to adjust discount rates for
the tax effect of leverage. It has the merits of being simple, very close to the discrete adjustment
formula (14), and easy to use to convert RL to RU as well as vice versa. Finally, row (d) shows the
errors from using Taggart’s formula (16), which assumes riskfree debt. Not surprisingly, the errors
here become quite large as leverage and the debt spread grow. For example, in Case 3 where the
tax advantage to debt is at its maximum, the leverage ratio is 80%, and the debt spread is 2%, the
error is almost a full percentage point.
5 Implementation using the CAPM
A common approach is to use formulas for tax adjusted discount rates in conjunction with the
CAPM. For example, one first estimates the equity beta and unlevers it to get the asset beta,
then one calculates RU using the CAPM, and finally calculates RL using one of the formulas above.
Alternatively, one calculates RL as the weighted average cost of capital by plugging equity and debt
betas into the CAPM. From that one can infer RU and perhaps calculate new RL’s for a different
leverage ratios. In this section, we derive formulas for the implementation using the CAPM that
are consistent with (18).
5.1 The CAPM with personal taxes
The consensus investor will set returns so that the risk-return ratio from assets is equal on an
after-investor-tax basis. This means that the standard version of the CAPM, where returns and
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betas are measured before investor taxes, will be affected by investor tax rates. Appendix 2 shows
that the version of the CAPM that is consistent with the assumptions about tax that determine
T ∗ is:
RE = RFE + βEP (19)
where RE is the expected rate of equity return before investor taxes, βE is the beta of the equity,
and
P = RM −RFE (20)
RM and RF are measured in the standard way, using returns before investor taxes. Betas are also
measured in the standard way, using pre-tax returns.
Note that only if T ∗ = TC (or, equivalently, TPE = TPD) is the standard version of the CAPM,
with an intercept equal to RF , valid. In particular, this means that the assumption in, for instance,
Modigliani and Miller (1963) that T ∗ = TC corresponds to the normal CAPM. In contrast, the
Miller (1977) view that T ∗ = 0 corresponds to a CAPM where the intercept is RF (1 − TC). A
similar effect can be seen in the formula for the required return on unlevered assets:7
RU = RFE + βUP (21)
As previously pointed out by Sick (1990) [see also Benninga and Sarig (2003)], the required
return on debt follows a different version of the CAPM, because the tax treatment of debt and
equity differ in all cases other than the standard MM case:
RD = RF + βDP (22)
Regardless of the assumption about taxes, the pre-tax CAPM holds for debt, because all debt is
taxed in the same way.8
5.2 The WACC and the asset beta
The standard WACC relationship is:
RD(1− TC)L+RE(1− L) =WACC (23)
7Care must be taken to distinguish between the unlevered beta, βU , and the beta of the firm value given by the
sum of debt and equity. The latter is affected by the beta of the tax saving, as we discuss below.
8There is another complexity with risky debt. It is not clear that the entire premium over the riskless rate is due
to beta risk. We do not deal with this issue here. See Cooper and Davydenko (2004) for a discussion.
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Under the ME assumptions, the WACC is equal to RL, so, using the continuous rebalancing
assumption [see (18)]:
RD(1− TC)L+RE(1− L) = RU − LT ∗RD
1− TC
1− T ∗ (24)
Substituting in RE, RU , and RD from (19), (21), and (22), respectively, we have that the unlevered
asset beta is
βU = βD[(1− TC)/(1 − T ∗)]L+ βE(1− L) (25)
If T ∗ = TC [or, equivalently TPE = TPD, see (5)], this reduces to the standard asset beta equation:
βU = βDL+ βE(1− L) (26)
We can intuitively understand the relationships between betas in the following way. The lever-
aged firm’s operating assets are the same as those for the all-equity firm. But the leveraged firm
generates extra value through the tax saving from interest and changes the after-tax risk of the
cash flow by channeling some of it to debtholders rather than equityholders, which changes the
associated tax treatment. The weighted average of the equity beta and the tax-adjusted debt beta
for the leveraged firm must equal the asset beta adjusted for the effect of the tax saving:
EβE +D
1 − TPD
1− TPE
βD = βU (VL − VTS) + VTSβTS (27)
where E is the value of the equity, D the value of the debt, VL = E +D, VTS is the value of the
tax shield and βTS is its beta. The value (VL − VTS) is the all-equity value of the firm, which has
beta equal to βU . The adjustment 1−TPD1−TPE to the debt beta reflects the fact, shown in (39), that the
differential tax treatment of debt and equity results in a change in beta when cash flow is switched
from equity to debt, even apart from the effect on the value of the firm. With the ME assumptions
and continuous debt rebalancing, βTS = βU , giving (25).9
6 Conclusions
We have presented tax-adjusted discount rate and asset beta formulas with Miles-Ezzell constant
debt to value leverage policy, investor taxes, and risky debt. Formulas assuming riskless debt have
9In general, with the ME debt policy βTS and βU are not equal, because of discrete rebalancing and also the
effect of debt default (Sick (1990)). However, with continuous rebalancing, βTS and βU are equal because the effect
of discrete rebalancing disappears and the difference cause by debt default becomes negligible.
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previously been derived by Taggart (1991). We also have compared and contrasted our formula for
tax-adjusted discount rates with those of (1990) and Brealey and Myers (1988), who also allow for
risky debt. Differences arise because of nonstandard assumptions about the tax system (Sick) or
missing tax effects at the personal level (Brealey and Myers). Using realistic parameter values, we
have shown that errors from these formulas can be almost a full percentage point at high leverage
levels. The correct formula, assuming discrete rebalancing of debt, is complex. However, the
approximation based on continuous rebalancing is very accurate:
RL = RU − LRDT ∗
(1− TC)
(1− T ∗)
(28)
This approximation has the merits of being simple, very close to the discrete adjustment formula,
and easy to use to convert RL to RU as well as vice versa.We have also presented the formulas for
asset betas and implementation using the CAPM that are consistent with this.
Appendix 1: Proof of the relationship between RL and RU
We derive relationship between RL and RU by induction, starting at time T − 1. At that time, the
only cash flow remaining is CT . The unleveraged value is:
VUT−1 = CT (1− TC)/(1 +RU ) (29)
This is the unleveraged value of the last cash flow. It includes implicitly the value to the represen-
tative investor of the tax deduction associated with the purchase price, VUT−1.
From the leveraged firm, the representative shareholder will receive, at date T , a cash flow after
personal taxes of CT (1− TC)(1− TPE) + ITTS . The first part of this cash flow is identical to that
from the unleveraged firm and so has value equal to VUT−1, if it comes with a tax deduction of
VUT−1. The second flow has risk equal to the debt of the firm, and should be discounted at the
after-tax rate appropriate to the debt of the firm, RD(1 − TPD). There is a third component of
value. Relative to an investment in the unleveraged firm, the representative investor also gets an
extra tax deduction equal to (VLT−1 − VUT−1). This is riskless, and is discounted at his after-tax
riskless rate. Using IT = LVLT−1RD, the resulting value of the leveraged firm is:
VLT−1 = VUT−1 +
LVLT−1RDTS
1 +RD(1− TPD)
+
(VLT−1 − VUT−1)TPE
1 +RF (1− TPD)
(30)
The last term in this expression is the incremental saving in capital gains taxes, which are assumed
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to be paid every year.10 The tax basis is higher for the leveraged firm by the amount (VLT−1 −
VUT−1), and capital gains taxes are consequently reduced.
Using (6), we can rearrange (30)as:
VLT−1 = VUT−1 +
LVLT−1T ∗RFERD(1 +RF (1− TPD))
(1 +RFE)RF (1 +RD(1− TPD))
(31)
At time T-1, RL and RU are defined by:
(1 +RL) = CT (1− TC)/VLT−1 (32)
(1 +RU ) = CT (1− TC)/VUT−1 (33)
Thus VUT−1 = VLR−1(1 +RL)/(1 +RU ). Substituting this into (31), we get
RL = RU −
LRDT ∗(1 +RU )RFE(1 +RF (1− TPD))
(1 +RFE)RF (1 +RD(1− TPD))
(34)
We will establish the generality of this formula by induction. Consider first time T − 2. Consider
the expected cash flow at T − 1, CT−1, and the continuation value, VLT−1, as two separate but
equally levered flows. Denote their values at T − 2 by wT−2 and WT−2, respectively. The same
argument as above establishes that wT−2 = CT−1(1− TC)/(1 +RL), with RL given by (34). Now,
we have established above that VLT−1 is proportional to VUT−1. Therefore, its unleveraged value
at T −2 is VLT−1/(1+RU ). Thus, using the same argument as above, the leveraged value of VLT−1
at T − 2 is WT−2 = VLT−1/(1 +RL), with RL given by (34). This establishes that
VT−2 =
CT−1(1− TC)
1 +RL
+
CT (1− TC)
(1 +RL)2
(35)
This argument can be repeated for arbitrary T , which establishes the generality of (34).
Appendix 2: Relationships between betas and returns
The representative investor sets returns so that after-tax returns are in equilibrium. However, the
CAPM is usually stated in terms of pre-tax betas and risk premia. This Appendix uses the after-tax
CAPM to derive the pre-tax version that is consistent with the assumptions about the tax saving
on debt.
10There is an emerging literature that introduces realistic treatment of capital gains taxes into the capital structure
literature (see Lewellen and Lewellen (2004)). The implications of their results for practical valuation are not yet
clear.
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Assuming that the market portfolio consists of only equities and not risky debt, and denoting
betas that are after personal tax by primes, and pre-tax betas with no primes:
β′E =
Cov(R˜E(1− TPE), R˜M (1− TPE))
V ar(R˜M (1− TPE))
=
Cov(R˜E , R˜M )
V ar(R˜M )
= βE (36)
similarly:
β′A = βU (37)
and:
β′D =
Cov(R˜D(1− TPD), R˜M (1− TPE))
V ar(R˜M (1− TPE))
=
(1− TPD)
(1 − TPE)
βD. (38)
Expected returns are set by the consensus investor to give equal after-tax risk premia per unit of
after-tax beta:
RE(1− TPE) = RF (1− TPD) + βEP ′ (39)
RU (1− TPE) = RF (1− TPD) + βUP ′
RD(1− TPD) = RF (1− TPD) + βD
(1− TPD)
(1 − TPE)
P ′
where P ′ is the post-tax market risk premium; P ′ = RM (1−TPE)−RF (1−TPD) = RM (1−TPE)−
RFE(1− TPE). Substituting P = P ′/(1− TPE) for P ′ gives the expressions for the pre-tax returns
on equity and debt:
RE = RFE + βEP (40)
RU = RFE + βUP (41)
RD = RF + βDP. (42)
Most empirical observations about risk premia are made in terms of pre-tax returns, so these are
the expressions that should be used to interpret data on risk premia. Note, however, that the
equity risk premia should be measured relative to the tax-adjusted riskless rate, RFE, rather than
the pre-tax rate RF .
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